Multi-Service Group Key Management for High Speed Wireless Mobile Multicast Networks by Mapoka, Trust T. et al.
 The University of Bradford Institutional 
Repository 
http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk 
This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please refer to the 
repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from the repository home 
page for further information. 
To see the final version of this work please visit the publisher’s website. Available access to 
the published online version may require a subscription. 
Link to publisher’s version: http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.11-8-2015.150093 
Citation:  Mapoka TT, Shepherd SJ, Dama YAS, Al Sabbagh HM and Abd-Alhameed RA (2015) 
Multi-service group key management for high speed wireless mobile multicast networks. EAI 
Endorsed Transactions on Mobile Communications and Applications. 15(6): e4. 
Copyright statement:  © 2015 Raed A. Abd-Alhameed et al. This is an Open Access article 
distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unlimited use, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium so long as the original work is properly cited.  
 
EAI Endorsed Transactions 
on Mobile Communications and Applications Research Article 
1 
Multi-Service Group Key Management for High Speed 
Wireless Mobile Multicast Networks 
Trust T. Mapoka1, Simon J. Shepherd1, Yousef A.S Dama1,2, Haider M. Al Sabbagh3, and Raed A. 
Abd-Alhameed1,* 
1Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Bradford, Bradford, BD7 1DP, United Kingdom 
2Electrical Engineering, An-Najah National University, Nablus, Palestinian 
3Electrical Engineering, Basra University, Basra, Iraq 
Abstract 
*Corresponding author. Email: r.a.a.abd@bradford.ac.uk 
1. Introduction
Multicast is an efficient communication technology for
the provision of group-oriented services over the Internet. 
These include services such as VOD (Video on Demand) 
and video conferencing. The services could be deployed 
more comfortably in wireless mobile networks than in wired 
networks because the entire receiving nodes within the 
transmission range of the broadcast medium can receive the 
services in a single transmission. Thus, the multicast 
services are expected to be dominating services by 
considering the fact that the majority of the recent standards 
committees of wireless networks such as E-MBMS in LTE 
[1] have standardised them. However, to provide access
control to the broadcasted multicast services, a symmetric 
group key, known as the Traffic Encryption Key (TEK), has 
been widely deployed to guarantee secure group 
communications among the subscribed group members. 
Thus the broadcasted services encrypted by the TEK at the 
Service Provider (SP) end are decrypted by the authorised 
group members holding the same valid TEK at the receivers 
end assuming multicast routing protocols are in place. 
Although symmetric effort provide efficiency in 
achieving secure group communications than asymmetric 
effort with heavier computation effort, it causes some 
challenges in GKM because the TEK need to be updated to 
achieve both forward and backward secrecy [2] during 
group membership dynamics caused by joins, leaves and 
mobility. Conventional GKM schemes for secure wired and 
wireless multicast [3, 4] networks only target a single 
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multicast service subscribed by low mobility users. In 
addition to our multi-service group key management scheme 
known as SMGKM [5],  dedicated to providing secure 
multi-group oriented services to mobile users who 
dynamically perform handoff while seamlessly participating 
in multiple multicast services, we now consider rekeying 
during dynamic movement of high mobility users in multi-
service subscriptions who then leave subscriptions after 
multiple cluster visits. However, recently part of this paper 
has been presented in[6, 7].  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews the related work. Section 3 describes the scenario 
for high speed mobility environment with multi-leaves in 
SMGKM compared to the related work. Section 4 presents 
the performance analysis of SMGKM in terms of 
communication and storage overheads in high mobility 
environment compared to the concerned schemes. Section 5 
shows the simulated results for the concerned schemes along 
with their performance discussions. Section 6 finally 
concludes the paper.  
2. Related Work
It is expected that the conventional wireless GKM
schemes such as are DeCleene et al [8], GKMF [9] and 
Kellil et al [10]  may induce huge rekeying communication 
overheads in rekeying the TEK when the group becomes 
flooded with high mobility users which perform frequent 
handoffs while participating in diverse multicast services. In 
a wireless environment there is limited bandwidth and high 
error rate of packet loss. In order to preserve the available 
bandwidth it is vital to consider reducing the communication 
overheads while preserving secrecy of services in the 
conventional wireless GKM schemes [3, 4] during frequent 
handoffs, where rekeying and multiple authentication 
notifications may be triggered more frequently. In addition 
to this, in a wireless environment portable mobile user 
devices such as laptops, smartphones and IPads are power 
constrained by nature. In this case highly mobile users may 
be susceptible to frequent disconnections to the subscribed 
services before the subscription period elapses due to 
accelerated battery drainage. In order to preserve the power 
usage in user devices it is also crucial to reduce the huge 
computation and storage complexities the resource 
constrained mobile device cannot handle in the conventional 
wireless GKM schemes, especially the existence of multiple 
service subscriptions [11].  
The conventional wireless GKM schemes are possible to 
cause storage complexities in the highly mobile users 
because the users maintain the local cluster keys (KEKs) for 
the previously visited clusters during frequent handoffs. 
Eventually when these users leave or drop the subscriptions 
after multiple visits, this triggers repeated rekeying of the 
entire keys (TEKs and local KEKs) held by the highly 
mobile users in all the previously visited clusters for 
forward secrecy hence causing extra rekeying signalling 
load in the network. Additionally, during frequent handoffs, 
the schemes also require synchronisation with the trusted 
Domain Key Distributor (DKD) for requesting the TEK 
during rekeying, user authentication as well as for tracking 
mobility hence the name key-request schemes [4, 12]. The 
DKD in key-request schemes controls the entire local cluster 
managers called the Area Key Distributors in a decentralised 
environment.  
Moreover frequent handoffs constitute a huge number of 
notifications to the DKD which cannot be a negligible 
communication overhead anymore. This occurs especially in 
vehicle-related services, such as telematics services where 
high speed vehicles handover frequently, hence repeated 
rekeying and authentication notification requests. Also, if 
the entire key management and authentication functions of 
the TEK are concentrated on the DKD which is a single 
point of failure and maybe far from the serving AKD, the 
multicast services become vulnerable to service disruptions 
due to rekeying delivery and authentication delays. 
Therefore, the characteristics of the key-request schemes are 
unsuitable for high speed wireless networks with multiple 
services. This has motivated us to build an efficient multi-
service GKM scheme suitable for high speed mobility users 
in this paper. 
3. Scenario for High Mobility in SMGKM
By maintaining SMGKM network model assumptions in
[5, 12], we further explore the performance of the SMGKM 
in the presence of high mobility users which perform 
frequent handoffs across multiple clusters. The users finally 
leave the target clusters after multiple cluster visits while 
participating in multiple subscriptions concurrently.  
The SMGKM [5] is a two-tier cluster-based [13, 14] 
decentralized multi-service GKM scheme. It consists of the 
DKD for initial registration of subscribers, initial generation 
of cryptographic key parameters for authentication and key 
management. It also consists of cluster controllers called 
AKDs which operate under the jurisdiction of the DKD for 
securely establishing and distributing the group key 
management keys to valid mobile subscribers over a 
bandwidth limited wireless domain. The mobile users use 
portable devices like smartphones, Ipads, etc. to wirelessly 
access their subscribed multimedia services over the 
internet. Each AKD manages the TEK independently per 
cluster in order to localize group key management. Both the 
authentication [15] and group key management phases are 
delegated securely from the trusted DKD to the intermediate 
AKDs using a novel Session Key Distribution List (SKDL) 
[12] to offer DKD scalability, prevent bottlenecks and
unnecessary delays during the system lifetime [5, 11] . The
SMGKM utilises the multi-service rekeying strategy for
efficient delivery of the TEKi,,j group-key-shares destined
for mobile users belonging to the same service group [11].
Let us now consider a scenario where highly mobile 
users belong to the same service group GK. The service 
group GK determines users accessing exactly the same set of 
services (s1, s2,…, sj) and  this simplifies key management 
with multi-service subscriptions [5]. Suppose that users M1, 
M2, M5 and M9 in Figure 1 access three of the pay-tv 
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services concurrently such as sports (s1), movie (s2) and 
music (s2) out of 8 services provided by the SP. The 
assumption is also that users can seamlessly access the 
subscribed services in a high mobility environment such as 
vehicular networks where frequent handoffs may occur 
hence making multiple visits possible before users 
leave/drop the subscriptions. The cellular clusters of the 
SMGKM scheme illustrated in Figure 1 consist of two types 
of subscribed users: 
• Present in the cluster (PIC) users currently being
served by the AKDi. These are considered as low
mobility users assuming they stay long in the
service.
• Absent in the cluster (AIC) users who have visited
multiple clusters served by the target AKDv after
frequent handoffs. These users are considered to
have high mobility.
Clearly it can be observed from the AIC mobile users in 
SMGKM that M1 and M2 in GK have previously visited 
AKD0, AKD1, AKD2 and AKD3 by performing frequent 
handoffs then finally stay at the target AKD5 before 
dropping subscriptions. M9 has previously visited AKD5 and 
AKD0 before leaving at AKD2. Similarly, M5 has previously 
visited AKD4, AKD3 and AKD0 before leaving at AKD1.  
Figure 1. High mobility scenario with multiple visits 
The assumption is that all Mi in GK follow the same 
mobility pattern and SMGKM has already carried out the 
multi-service rekeying strategy based on Key Update Slots 
(KUS) [5, 11], to satisfy backward secrecy during frequent 
handoffs at the visited AKDv and forward secrecy where 
M1, M2, M5 and M9 currently leave. The rekeying strategy 
detects the affected services during group dynamics so that 
the AKDs generate and securely deliver new TEK shares for 
the affected services to the PIC users where a join or leave 
occurs [11]. The assumption is that the Authentication phase 
of users is also performed at the target cluster during 
handoff using the Session Key Distribution List (SKDL) 
concept which tracks mobility at the AKD level without the 
DKD intervention hence DKD scalability [12].  
3.1. Comparison of SMGKM with Key- 
Request Schemes for High Mobility 
In this section, we summarise the characteristics of key-
request schemes against SMGKM for suitability in high 
speed environments. As presented in Table 1, the key-
request schemes adopt a two-tier decentralised framework 
with a common TEK approach. This approach allows highly 
mobile subscribers to maintain common TEK across the 
board, hence requiring the entire group members to commit 
to the new TEK whenever it changes due to group 
dynamics. The schemes also assume that the main DKD and 
the cluster managers which are the AKDs in this case have 
significant computation and storage resources to maintain 
and update the TEK and local cluster keys (KEK), 
respectively. Additionally, the introduced local KEKs 
maintained at the AKD level are used to safely distribute the 
TEK from the DKD to the users at the cluster level during 
rekeying, hence alleviating the need to renew the TEK 
during group dynamics. However, this enhances the 
rekeying performance of the key-request schemes by 
localising rekeying such that rekeying is only performed in 
the concerned cluster without affecting the neighbour 
clusters. The schemes also introduce the use of an unsecured 
mobility list to track user mobility such that only the target 
KEKs gets renewed while the TEK remains unchanged. 
However, this causes huge storage complexity for high 
mobility users with resource-limited devices in situations of 
multi-subscriptions. Mostly, the key-request schemes rely 
on a single trusted centralised DKD for controlling all the 
AKDs as well as for TEK generation, TEK distribution and 
user authentication. Again, since the DKD controls the 
topological network reflecting all mobile user locations, it 
should be notified by all the AKDs whenever users undergo 
handoff and whenever existing mobile users leave the 
multicast services. However, this is not practical that a 
single entity controls the entire network consisting of 
millions of mobile users and huge AKDs. Additionally, 
frequent handoffs lead to a huge number of notifications 
with the DKD which cannot be a negligible communication 
overhead any more especially in vehicle-related services, 
such as telematics services where high speed vehicles 
handover frequently hence repeated rekeying. Also, if the 
entire key management functions of the TEK are 
concentrated on the DKD which is the single point of failure 
and maybe far from the serving AKD, the multicast services 
become vulnerable to service disruptions due to rekeying 
delivery and authentication delays. 
 In contrast, SMGKM offers qualitative benefits by 
decentralising some parts of the DKD tasks such as 
offloading the authentication and key management functions 
to the intermediate AKDs [5]. This was also inspired by the 
fact that each AKD has enough computing power 
capabilities to handle these phases independently to share 
the load across the entire network hence giving DKD 
scalability while alleviating the single point of failure 
problem.   
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Table 1. Comparison of SMGKM characteristics against Key-Request schemes for a high mobility situation 
Evaluation criteria DeCleene et al [8] GKMF [9] Kellil et al [10] SMGKM [5] 
Decentralised framework Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Key independence Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of layers 2 2 2 2 
Forward secrecy on user handoff No No No No 
Backward secrecy on user handoff Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rekey all visited clusters at leave Yes Yes Yes No 
1-affect-n phenomenon Yes Yes Yes No 
Localize rekeying at handoff Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AKD to AKD communication No No No Yes 
Support multi-group subscriptions No No No Yes 
Single point of failure Yes Yes Yes No 
DKD scalability No No No Yes 
Use of list to manage mobility Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authentication at move No No No Yes 
Suitability for high speed mobile users No No No Yes 
Thus, authentication of highly mobile users during 
frequent handoffs and rekeying of the TEK for the affected 
services are both performed at the cluster level without 
involving the DKD. Each AKD keeps track of the users 
currently residing in its own cluster using the Secure 
Distribution List (SKDL) [12]. This enables independent 
generation and management of service keys locally during 
rekeying without affecting the neighbour clusters. 
Additionally, handoff is not synchronised with the DKD, 
which significantly reduce the signalling load at SMGKM 
wireline [11]. Also, the control overhead of the DKD, such 
as maintaining and updating the trace history and the 
assigned keys for each highly mobile user is alleviated in 
SMGKM. This however has made SMGKM scheme very 
simple, but a practical and effective multi-group key 
management scheme for high speed networks.  
4. Performance Analysis
This section investigates the performance of SMGKM
scheme with comparisons to legacy key-request schemes by 
applying two types of rekeying approaches: Pairwise and 
LKH tree based [16] rekeying approaches. We also measure 
the storage complexity in highly mobile users with frequent 
handoffs.  
4.1. Communication Overheads 
We focus on the extra rekeying communication overhead 
emanating from the unicast transmissions caused by 
delivering rekeying messages, under the assumption that this 
overhead is the most vital factor in wireless networks where 
radio resources are limited in the presence of high mobility 
users participating in multi-services. We also consider the 
communication overhead induced by the control messages 
emanating from the handoff and authentication requests at 
the wired network beyond each AKD.  
In this network, let us assume that the various multicast 
services provided by the SP covers a huge area consisting of  
C clusters, and the number of mobile users Mi existing in 
each cluster is maintained at N. Let us define a random 
variable X as the number of clusters that Mi has visited 
before leaving the multicast services. Thus, the expected 
number of clusters previously visited, which represent the 
degree of user mobility, can be denoted as E(X). Now let us 
contrast the rekeying communication overhead induced in 
SMGKM in contrast to the key-request schemes whenever 
multi-leaves caused by high mobility users occur after 
visiting multiple clusters. Stopping subscriptions may be 
due to various reasons such as subscription period elapse or 
battery failures.  
4.1.1 Multi-leaves with Forward Secrecy in Key- 
Request Schemes 
First assume that key-request schemes are used, not 
considering multi-services and multi-leaves in a wireless 
mobile network. The key-request schemes achieve more 
efficiency by limiting rekeying only to the clusters which 
have been visited by a leaving user. Thus, the rekeying 
communication overhead is mainly dependent on the 
number of clusters that a leaving user has visited. Since the 
leaving user maintains the local cluster keys for each of the 
visited clusters, each previously visited AKDi should unicast 
O(N) rekeying messages including the updated local cluster 
keys to PIC users of the visited clusters. After updating the 
local cluster keys, each AKDi distributes the new TEK from 
the DKD. This induces rekeying communication overhead 
in the entire wireless network, ROwireless, of  
CNOXEROwireless +⋅= )()( . (1) 
Additionally, the key-request schemes require notifying 
the DKD about users’ handoff as well as the TEK update. 
Though the notifications may be negligible in size, they 
cannot be overlooked in the presence of high mobility users 
and multi-services requiring TEK update in the network. 
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The notifications should be delivered to and from the DKD 
as a form of a control message in the wired network beyond 
the AKDs. Therefore, the total number of notifications at the 
wired network, Nw, on average gives 
CNOXEN w ⋅⋅= )()( (2) 
Let us now use a wireless weight denoted as ⍺ in [17] to 
demonstrate the importance of the wireless cost. Therefore, 
the total rekeying communication overhead for the key-
request schemes, ROKEY-REQUEST, induced at the wireline and 
wireless part of the network becomes 
wwirelessREQUESTKEY NRORO ⋅α−+⋅α=− )1(
where 0 ≤ ⍺ ≤ 1. 
(3) 
However, in the presence of S-multi-services and x 
services requiring rekeying at user departure, the key-
request schemes perform independent rekeying of the 
affected services whenever N-multi-leaves occur at the 
target cluster after visiting E(X) clusters. Thus, equation (3) 
gives 
wwirelessREQUESTKEY NSxROSxRO )/()1()/( ⋅α−+⋅⋅α=− (4) 
4.1.2 Multi-leaves with Forward Secrecy in SMGKM 
In contrast with the key-request schemes, SMGKM only 
performs rekeying at the target cluster where multiple 
departures occur regardless of the number of visited clusters. 
The DKD does not need to keep track of mobile subscribers 
because each AKDi independently controls its own users 
due to cryptographically separate keys adopted per cluster in 
SMGKM. Thus, on every handoff, SMGKM provides 
access control mechanism which uses the SKDL concept 
[12] for authentication of highly mobile users before
obtaining the new service group keys used for service access
control at the target cluster. After a complete handoff of a
mobile user, the cluster local keys for the previously visited
clusters are automatically revoked under the assumption that
the mobile users have the capability to store keys only for
the target cluster. This is what differentiates SMGKM to the
key-request schemes, hence less storage complexity at the
mobile receiver [11]. This additionally lessens the number
of rekeying communication overheads significantly.
Now let us consider M1 and M2 in GK which finally stop 
x services after visiting E(X) clusters. We first compute the 
number of AIC in the visited clusters at user departure. The 
assumption is that a handoff that occurs between two non-
adjacent clusters can be possible, which is tolerable enough 
to make the performance comparison. Consider a certain 
cluster v whose AKD initially consists of N mobile users. 
Assume that N individual users move from one cluster to 
another at least E(X) times, i.e., highly mobile user visits 
E(X) clusters. Whenever the users finally drop the 
subscriptions at departure, only E(X) of the initial N users 
remain in cluster v while E(X)−1/E(X) of N users have left 
cluster v. Furthermore, let us also consider other users 
participating in the same set of services in GK from other 
clusters with the exception of cluster v. A user of the other 
clusters can be considered to pick (E(X) – 1) visiting clusters 
amongst (C – 1) clusters. Therefore, the probability that the 
highly mobile user does not visit cluster v can be evaluated 
using k-permutations of n denoted as P(n, k) or k-
combinations of an n-set denoted as C(n, k) in elementary 
combinatory contexts. Thus, the value of ),( knP over k 
factors is generally given by the product: 
 otherwise            
nk for
k)!-(n
n!
knP






 <
=
0
),( . 
(5) 
The value of P(n, k) is well defined without the 
assumption that n is a non-negative integer. However the 
convention of permutation is closely related to combination. 
Thus, a k-element combination of an n-set S is a k-element 
subset of S, the elements of which are unordered. For 
example, by taking all the k element subsets of S and 
ordering them individually in all conceivable ways, we 
obtain all the k-permutations of S. Therefore the number of 
k-combinations of an n-set, C(n, k), relate to the value of
P(n, k) by:
!!
  
),(
),(),(
k(n-k)
n!
kkP
knPknC
=
= (6) 
Note that the values in equation (5) and (6) are known as 
binomial coefficients and can be represented as 




k
n . By
using this representation, where n denote the cluster 
variations of C and k denote factors of the visited clusters 
E(X), as the highly mobile user handoffs, we can evaluate 
the probability PPIC, that the highly mobile user does not 
visit the target cluster v as: 





−
−




−
−= 1)(
1/1)(
2
XE
C
XE
CPPIC
(7) 
Therefore, by using the relation in equation (7), we can 
obtain the number of highly mobile users that has visited the 
target cluster v from other clusters as: 
PICAIC PNP ⋅−= 1 . (8) 
      Likewise, only 1/E(X) of the N users remain in cluster v 
while E(X)−1/E(X) of the N users have left. Consequently, 
the number of AICs in the visited clusters, denoted by L, can 
be calculated as: 
])1()[(/1)( AICPCNXEXEL −+−= (9)
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In contrast to the key-request schemes, since SMGKM 
independently manages its own TEK per cluster, the visited 
AKDs do not undergo rekeying except the target cluster 
where multi-leaves currently occur under the assumption 
that leaves occur concurrently while participating in multi-
services. It should be noted that it is possible for multi-
leaves to occur at various locations visited (i.e., E(X)) in 
SMGKM as shown in Figure 1. Therefore, in order to 
guarantee forward secrecy at the concerned cluster, 
SMGKM needs to unicast O(N+L) rekeying messages to the 
PIC user of the concerned clusters in order to deliver the 
updated TEK shares for the services affected by multi-
leaves. Additionally, SMGKM does not need to notify the 
DKD about the user mobility since AKDi automatically 
revokes the rows for the corresponding departures from 
SKDLi. However, the notification of the updated TEK 
shares at the concerned AKDi to the SP is absolutely 
necessary at the wired part of SMGKM. The 
notification/control message uses the KUS notifier which is 
negligible in size and dependent on the number of affected 
services x, assuming that the SP also has prior knowledge of 
the KUS operation to update the service keys. This on 
average gives the total number of notifications, Nn, beyond 
the concerned clusters as: 
)/()( SxOXEN n ⋅= . (10) 
Therefore, in the presence of S-multi-services and x
services requires rekeying if L-users departure, SMGKM 
induces total rekeying communication overhead of 
nSMGKM NLNOXERO )1()}()({ α−++⋅α= . (11) 
If we apply the LKH rekeying approach to equation (4) 
and (11), we employ the well-known fact that rekeying of a 
balanced tree of degree d accommodating N users requires d 
logd N rekeying messages for a leaving user. This 
equivalently reduces the rekeying communication overheads 
logarithmically with the number of leaving users. Thus, 
equations (4) and (11) respectively become:  
wdREQUESTKEY NSxNdOSxRO )/()1()(log()/( ⋅α−+⋅⋅α=− (12) 
and 
ndSMGKM NLNdOXERO )1())}(log()({ α−++⋅α=
(13) 
4.2. Storage Overheads 
High mobility users maintain the local cluster key 
management keys for the previously visited clusters in the 
key-request schemes as they perform frequent handoffs. 
This may reasonably add storage complexity to the resource 
constraint mobile devices, the AKD and the DKD, hence 
slow execution and slow accessibility to the stored keys in 
the underlying system. This section measures the number of 
keys held by the participating network entities at each 
network level.  Assume that N high mobility individual 
users perform frequent handoff by visiting at least E(X) 
clusters of the available C clusters while participating in x of 
the total S available multicast services in the underlying 
system. The expected storage complexity in key-request 
schemes and SMGKM after N high mobility users’ 
participating in x of the S services visit E(X) clusters out of 
C total clusters is summarised in Table 2. The simulation 
scenarios presenting the storage complexity of the 
underlying system in the presence of high speed users is 
presented in section 5. 
Table 2. Comparison of storage complexity during high mobility 
Storage overhead KEY-REQUEST SCHEMES SMGKM 
DeCleene et al [8] GKMF [9] Kellil et al [10] 
At the user 
At the AKD 
At the DKD
(x/S+2)E(X) 
(N+1)E(X) 
(x/S) E(X) 
(x/S+3)E(X) 
(N+4)E(X) 
(x/S+2)E(X) 
(x/S+3)E(X) 
(N+2)E(X) 
(x/S) E(X) 
     (x/S)+2 
     N+1 
     N 
5. Simulation Results and Discussion
To compare the performances of the above schemes, we
consider S-multicast services covering a huge cellular 
cluster decentralised topology containing 1000 clusters 
under the assumption that each cluster has a total of 400 
mobile users subscribed to these services from various 
locations. The expectation is that each user is likely to visit 
E(X) clusters on average before leaving the subscribed 
multicast services simultaneously, where E(X) varies from 
10 to 60.  
A higher E(X) means that a user has the higher mobility. 
Also, the assumption is that the wireless cost of the network 
is much greater than wire line cost. Hence, we set the 
wireless weight to be 0.999 in order to weight wireless links 
much more than wired links. To summarize, we set the 
hypothetical parameters as x=3 to be the number of affected 
services requiring rekeying out of S=8 total multicast 
services provided by the SP, C=1000, N=400, ⍺=0.999, 
respectively. We use the MATLAB simulation tool to 
represent the simulated results in the next section.  
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5.1. Communication Overheads 
From the simulation results in Figure 2, we compare the 
communication overheads emanating from employing a 
pairwise [18] rekeying approach including the handover 
control messages at both the wireless and wireline parts of 
the SMGKM framework. It can be seen from Figure 2 that 
by employing pairwise rekeying approach, the performances 
of both schemes degrade with high user mobility and multi-
leaves participating in multi-services. 
Figure 2. Communication overheads emanating from pairwise 
rekeying and control messages 
Figure 3. Communication overheads emanating from LKH rekeying 
and control messages 
However, the SMGKM overhead outperforms that of the 
key-request schemes because high mobility users in key-
request schemes maintain the key management keys for the 
local E(X) clusters. This requires rekeying that incurs 
substantial rekeying communication overhead.  In contrast, 
SMGKM only rekeys the concerned clusters where user 
departure occurs hence reducing communication overheads 
significantly. 
If we employ the LKH tree rekeying approach with a 
balanced tree of degree d =4 at the affected clusters, the 
communication overheads reduces logarithmically with the 
number of leaving users for both the schemes, as shown in 
Figure 3. Some tree based rekeying approaches such as the 
TMKM-based scheme [17] can be used in the underlying 
system to achieve more efficient rekeying than the LKH 
scheme by limiting the users who should be updated to only 
the users in the cells which have been visited by the leaving 
users. 
5.2. Communication Overheads Ratio 
Additionally, in Figure 4 we further compare the ratio of 
the communication overheads for the concerned schemes.  
Figure 4. Relative communication overhead (the ratio ROKey_request to 
that of ROSMGKM) 
It can be observed in Figure 4 that when E(X) =30, the 
key-request schemes incur 10.6 times communication 
overheads as much as that of the SMGKM scheme. 
Therefore, the SMGKM obtains quantitative advantage of 
less communication overheads and qualitative advantage of 
distributing some parts of the DKD functions to the AKDs. 
5.2. Storage Overheads 
In order to compare the storage complexity caused by 
high mobility users for the concerned schemes, we set the 
same parameters for simulation. From the simulation 
scenarios in Figure 5, it can be observed that the key-request 
schemes add high storage complexity to the resource 
constraint highly mobile user Mi by introducing additional 
local cluster keys for localising rekeying. Thus, as the 
number of visited clusters E(X) increases, a highly mobile 
user device may lose connection to other subscriptions due 
to lack of storage space requirement.  In contrast to 
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SMGKM, extra storage requirement is not necessary 
because high mobility users only maintain the key 
management keys for the cluster where they currently 
reside, hence incurring less storage complexity at the 
communicating entities. This is also advantageous because 
repeated rekeying becomes unnecessary in SMGKM, hence 
reduced rekeying signalling overheads. The compromise to 
the keys held by the local users in SMGKM is limited to the 
currently serving AKD without affecting the neighbour 
clusters.    
Figure 5. Storage complexity in high mobility situation 
It can also be observed that some key-request schemes 
such as GKMF and Kellil et al. induce high storage 
overhead at the limited resource mobile users by introducing 
more encryption keys as E(X) and x variables increase. This 
may accelerate more power drainage, hence high likelihood 
of service disruptions. However, both the schemes increase 
the storage complexity at the intermediate keys AKDs 
because AKDs are assumed to have sufficient space and 
power to process the key management keys. It can also be 
observed that SMGKM gives the DKD storage scalability to 
accommodate more high mobility users, assuming Mi stays 
longer in the system without dropping subscriptions. 
6. Conclusion
This paper has addressed the inefficiency of existing key-
request GKM schemes for secure multicast in high mobility 
wireless networks by proposing an efficient and practical 
solution. The core of the proposed scheme is to decentralise 
the DKD key management and authentication functions. 
While the DKD only does the initial setup phase of the 
entire group membership, each AKD keeps track of users 
during handoff and manages the group TEK shares for 
multiple services independently per cluster to guarantee both 
backward and forward secrecy when frequent handoffs and 
multi-leaves participating in multi-services occur 
respectively. The proposed scheme also achieves high 
efficiency with significant reduction in the system 
communication overheads as well as reduced storage 
complexity in the communicating agents while preserving 
secrecy of services. The SMGKM also reduce the 
overburden of the DKD by distributing it to the intermediate 
AKDs in high mobility environments. Therefore, it is 
expected that the proposed protocol can be a practical 
solution for securing group communication with multi-
services in high speed wireless networks.  
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